

**Research Article**

## **Evaluation of the Delinquency Report System of the Coast Guard Non-Officers School Personnel: An Enhancement**

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### **Abstract**

PCG was the sole humanitarian armed service in the country and the third armed and uniformed service branch under the Department of Transportation. At the same time, it was unwavering in sticking to its essential role in environmental preservation, law enforcement, marine security, and promoting safe maritime travel. This study aimed to assess the delinquency report system at CGNOS, considering its implementation, challenges, and current level of awareness. To improve the institution's responsibility and discipline, it sought to provide useful insights that could guide the development of policies. A quantitative methodology with a descriptive-inferential approach was used for the study, and participants were chosen using purposive sampling. It was found out that the officers and non-officers had varying degrees of understanding and use of the delinquency report system. The policies and processes of the report system, how disposition was handled, and the consequences for withholding, postponing, and not acting on disposition present some challenges for both parties. Nonetheless, there was no appreciable difference in the delinquency report system's awareness and application between officers and non-officers. In conclusion, this study made the case that both officers and non-officers need to take part in focused training programs and pursue ongoing professional development to raise awareness and improve the delinquency report system's implementation.

**Keywords:** Philippine Coast Guard, Delinquency Report System, Maritime Military, Coast Guard Non-Officers' School.

### **Introduction**

The Coast Guard Non-Officers' School (CGNOS) was one of the operational units of the Coast Guard Education Training and Doctrine Command (CGETDC), primarily tasked in supporting the command's mission of delivering high-quality and standardized training to both newly recruited and current personnel of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) through the conduct of basic course, advance course, strategic course, and other CGETDC offered courses. Amidst a notable surge in personnel and the imperative to uphold discipline within its ranks, "NHQ-PCG/CGHRMC Circular Number 07-21 or the Delinquency Report (DR) system in the Philippine Coast Guard" was instituted by the PCG as one of the disciplinary mandates which featured the tool in addressing of minor infractions of rules and regulations committed by PCG personnel on active duty. Regrettably, there had been instances where some PCG Units failed to report such minor offenses.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the delinquency report system at CGNOS, including its current awareness, implementation, and challenges. It aimed to offer practical insights that could direct the creation of policies, eventually enhancing the institution's accountability and discipline.

### **Literature Review**

Teachman and Tedrow (2014) argued that delinquent behavior was positively related to enlistment in the military, as it could serve as a transition to adulthood and desistance from delinquent behavior. In line with this, members of the armed forces and, in certain situations, civilians with close ties to the armed forces were subjected to a unique legal system known as military justice. Maintaining discipline and good order within the armed forces and ensuring its operational efficacy were one of its primary goals. In addition, military justice had very different structures, regulations, and practices than their civilian equivalents (Vashakmazde, 2018).

Misconduct could have serious and far-reaching repercussions. This might include such violation of citizens' constitutional rights, civil lawsuits, criminal prosecutions, public scandal, civil unrest, and irreversible damage to the credibility of the officers. While recent studies had attempted to identify the root causes and relationships of misconduct, barely anything had been discovered about the trends and instances of inappropriate conduct by officers or the degree to which the organization itself influenced those patterns (Ackerley, 2017).

Code-of-silence views and convictions about noble-cause corruption were significantly predicted by organizational justice and deviant peers, who supported lesser instances of police misconduct. Deviant peer associations played a significant role not only in forecasting police misconduct. They appeared to be a necessary pre-condition for both abiding by the code of silence and thinking that corruption for noble purposes was acceptable (Tyler, 2017).

According to Onesto-Person (2018), there had been forms of discipline meted out to military personnel since the founding of our army, but it was not until 1920 when that was formally codified and called "disciplinary punishments." Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice outlined three (3) categories of nonjudicial punishment. The first kind was the Summarized Article 15, which was typically enforced by an officer of the company grade. A Summarized Article 15 allowed for a maximum penalty of 14 days of extra duty and/or restriction. A soldier was expected to be flagged during the suspension period. The only person authorized to administer nonjudicial punishment was a commander. Corrective training and other non-punitive measures ought to be tried before nonjudicial punishment.

On the other hand, the government's law enforcement initiatives could not be separated from the police. Act No. 2 of 2002 on Police stated that the primary responsibilities of the police were to maintain public order, enforce the law, and offer security, shelter, and community services. Police officers of today would play a crucial role in shaping culture tomorrow by undergoing self-transformation to adapt to changing social dynamics. The police must go back to their primary duty as the sector responsible for upholding social order (security, public order). As law enforcement officials, law enforcement agencies, and the police themselves were very appropriate as an organization when they operated independently and do not collaborate with Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) as part of the national defense apparatus (Setiyadi and Kusriyah, 2019).

Tyler (2017) examined procedural justice in policing and found that officers who perceived the disciplinary system as fair were more likely to adhere to professional standards. The study demonstrated that transparent policies and equitable enforcement contributed to higher compliance rates and improved officer accountability within law enforcement agencies. Specifically, the study found that areas with higher poverty rates and transient populations exhibited increased instances of police crime which reinforced the necessity for targeted policy interventions. Additionally, Rad *et al.*, (2023) examined the relationship between police unionism, accountability, and misconduct which demonstrated how union protections often hindered disciplinary actions against officers accused of wrongdoing.

Expanding on military discipline, Sungkono *et al.*, (2025) reviewed the enforcement of military discipline law, emphasizing its role in establishing professionalism within the national army and strengthening national security. Their study found that although discipline frameworks were robust, inconsistencies in enforcement weakened their overall effectiveness. Similarly, Teixeira *et al.*, (2024) analyzed empowering leadership in the military, weighing its pros and cons. While their findings suggested that empowerment fostered adaptability and morale. They also emphasized that these must be carefully balanced with hierarchical structures to maintain operational efficiency. Furthermore, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (2024) reported on the ongoing crisis in police recruitment and retention that highlighted staffing shortages and the urgent need for improved hiring strategies. Lastly, Cheatham and Maizland (2024) compared policing practices across different countries that illustrated how organizational structures, training, and accountability mechanisms varied significantly on a global scale.

Ouellet *et al.*, (2019) investigated the social transmission of police misconduct and determined that officers exposed to corrupt behaviors within their networks were more likely to engage in misconduct themselves. The study highlighted the importance of internal monitoring and ethical training programs to prevent the normalization of unethical practices within law enforcement agencies. Phiri *et al.*, (2023) explored resilience and emotional intelligence in crime prevention that concluded that officers who received psychological resilience training were better equipped to handle high-pressure situations. The findings suggested that

emotional intelligence development could enhance officers' decision-making abilities and contribute to more effective disciplinary processes. Gunawan *et al.*, (2022) assessed the implementation of personnel policies in the Indonesian Navy and found that inconsistencies in disciplinary enforcement undermined operational efficiency. The study recommended clearer procedural guidelines and improved oversight mechanisms to ensure uniform application of disciplinary actions across units. Wentzlof (2024) studied police crime in American counties and discovered that regions with stricter disciplinary measures exhibited lower rates of officer misconduct. The findings underscored the significance of rigorous training and policy enforcement in maintaining law enforcement integrity and preventing unethical behaviors.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) adopted a military court martial for the first time in 1938, following Commonwealth Act 408-which was commonly referred to as the Articles of War. The General Court-Martial, Special Court-Martial, and Summary Court-Martial were the three (3) different forms of court martial available to the AFP. Along with military judges, these courts also included a panel of officers who received cases and made decisions about it. The kind of court depended on the seriousness of the offense and the status of the accused. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) used the AFP's Military Justice System to handle administrative offenses committed by PCG personnel before it became an independent entity. The PCG's independence was terminated upon the establishment of its own legal system through Section 16 of RA 9993, also known as the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009. The PCG Code of Conduct and Discipline for PCG Uniformed Personnel was a set of guidelines that the Philippine Coast Guard developed in 2012 for administrative disciplinary actions against PCG Uniformed Personnel. This code's norms and regulations should govern the conduct, discipline, and disciplinary proceedings which involved all PCG Uniformed personnel. Nonetheless, changes to this system were made in 2014, 2016, and 2019. A few of these noteworthy modifications included the increase in the number of disciplinary boards from one to five in order to speed up the processing of administrative cases involving PCG personnel and the non-prescription of administrative disciplinary cases involving PCG Uniformed Personnel (Elioran, 2021).

The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, also known as Republic Act Number 1937 (RA No. 1937), was approved on June 22, 1957, an act designed to amend and to establish the Tariff and Customs Laws of the Philippines with regard to maritime matters. Subsequently, the BMI was authorized to conduct inquiries to support legal proceedings regarding maritime mishaps and the conduct of marine officers. The Bureau of Customs Commissioner received the report from the BMI investigation. The commissioner had the power to censure a licensed marine officer or suspend or revoke any marine certificate due to professional misconduct, intemperate habits or negligence, or incapacity, based on the recommendations and findings of the BMI (Ferre, 2022; Maneerin, 2023). Additionally, Pulkkinen and Writer (2024) examined the Coast Guard's Safe to Report policy, which aimed to encourage personnel to report misconduct without fear of retaliation. Although the study revealed improvements in transparency, challenges remained in ensuring consistent application across different units.

In the Navy, a unit's strong esprit de corps might also encourage soldiers to cover up wrongdoing. An instance of this conduct took place in Iraq in 2006 when a 14-year-old girl and her family were murdered by soldiers after they raped and killed them. Because of the strong sense of camaraderie within the unit, soldiers neglected to report the crimes. The soldier who eventually came forward to report the incident was shunned and worried about their safety (Worsley, 2023). Due to the pressure from crime victims who wanted action taken and because they feared sanctions, the case turned out to be beneficial in the future, even the most competent prosecutors in the Philippines had been hesitant to dismiss cases that at first appeared to be weak (Strasser, 2019).

Additionally, it was significant that the Coast Guard in the Philippines was purposefully choosing to ignore certain instances of misbehavior. Any victim of sexual assault who said they were afraid of the consequences for their small-scale collateral offenses said they were reluctant to come forward. Safe to Report eliminated that possibility. In a recent Workplace Gender Relations Survey, the Coast Guard found that 25% of female victims of sexual assault decided not to report the incident because they were afraid "they might get in trouble for something else they did." (Pulkkinen and Writer, 2024).

There was also a case wherein in 2022, RADM Cecil R. Chen, a retired Philippine Coast Guard official, was found guilty of grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and behavior detrimental to the service's best interests. The case began with an anonymous complaint about the use of PCG funds, specifically, with reference to the repayment of expenses submitted in 2014 and the liquidation of cash advances. Twenty-five PCG officials were the target of 21 issues for serious dishonesty, serious misconduct, and conduct detrimental to

the service's best interests from the Field Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (Inting, 2022).

Vicente *et al.*, (2020) examined the experiences of Philippine National Police personnel with decided administrative cases. The study found that officers often faced procedural delays and inconsistent application of disciplinary actions. Additionally, personnel expressed concerns about the fairness of decisions made by internal disciplinary boards, emphasizing the need for reforms in administrative processes to ensure accountability and transparency. Abanilla (2024) investigated the competencies of Philippine Coast Guard personnel in enforcing criminal laws. The results indicated that personnel exhibited significant knowledge gaps, particularly in the application of specific legal procedures relevant to maritime law enforcement. While officers had a general understanding of the law, they often struggled with practical implementation, highlighting the importance of specialized training programs to enhance operational efficiency. Empinado *et al.*, (2023) explored the experiences of Philippine Coast Guard rescuers and found that personnel frequently encountered hazardous conditions while responding to emergencies. The study revealed that coast guard members lacked sufficient equipment and training, which hindered their ability to perform rescue operations effectively. The findings emphasized the need for continuous skill development and improved resources to enhance rescue capabilities.

Jurado and Quinto (2023) analyzed the implementation of the Philippine National Police's E-Policing System and discovered that while the system improved documentation and case management efficiency, it also presented challenges related to technical reliability and accessibility. Personnel reported difficulties in navigating the system due to inadequate training, underscoring the necessity of digital literacy programs for law enforcement officers. Berbie (2024) developed a competency manual for Philippine Coast Guard commanding officers which revealed that leadership gaps contributed to inconsistencies in maritime security enforcement. The study suggested that structured leadership training could address these shortcomings by equipping officers with the skills necessary to manage personnel effectively and uphold disciplinary standards. For a more efficient recording of incidents and crimes, the study of Alincastre and Dalugdog (2022) stated that one of the new technologies the Philippine National Police (PNP) had acquired to facilitate the easy recording of incidents is the E-Project System, which was available to all stations in the country and could not be forged. The analysis and interpretation of criminal events in the Philippines could also be aided by this technology. Law enforcement organizations could examine and correlate data sources using computerized crime mapping technology to produce a comprehensive picture of crime incidents and associated variables in a community or other geographic area (Jurado and Quinto, 2023).

### **Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework for the study was grounded in several interrelated theories and models that provided a comprehensive understanding of organizational behavior, policy implementation, and reporting systems. This framework integrated elements from organizational culture theory, the theory of planned behavior, and institutional theory to analyze and address the research questions.

#### **Organizational Culture Theory**

Edgar Schein's Organizational Culture Model: This theory posited that organizational culture significantly influenced the behavior of its members. It included three (3) levels: artifacts (visible organizational structures and processes), espoused values (strategies, goals, and philosophies), and basic underlying assumptions (unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, and values). This model helped in understanding how the culture within CGNOS affected the awareness and implementation of the DRS. It explained how deeply ingrained cultural norms and values might encourage or discourage reporting delinquency (Schein, 2004).

#### **Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)**

Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior: This theory suggested that an individual's behavior was determined by their intention to perform the behavior, which in turn was influenced by their attitude towards the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. In the context of CGNOS, this theory could help explain the individual motivations behind reporting or not reporting delinquent behavior. It provided a framework to assess the personnel's attitudes towards the DRS including the social pressures they faced, and their perceived control over the reporting process (Ajzen, 1991).

#### **Institutional Theory**

Meyer and Rowan's Institutional Theory: This theory explained how organizational practices and policies were influenced by wider institutional norms, rules, and regulations. It emphasized the role of formal

structures and the importance of aligning organizational practices with external expectations to gain legitimacy. This theory was crucial for understanding the formal policies and procedures of the DRS at CGNOS and how these were aligned with or were diverged from broader institutional norms and standards (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).


### Conceptual Framework

The study focused on evaluating the awareness, implementation, and challenges associated with the Delinquency Report System (DRS) among personnel at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS). The key concepts included the levels of awareness regarding policies, procedures, treatment disposition, and punitive measures for withholding, delaying, or inaction of reports. It also examined the differences in perceptions and implementations between officers and non-officers and identified the challenges faced during the implementation of the DRS. The goal of this study was to develop policy improvements to enhance the effectiveness of the DRS.

Additionally, the legal basis of this study was grounded in various regulations and policies governing the operations and conduct within the Philippine Coast Guard. These relevant laws included the Philippine Coast Guard Law (Republic Act No. 9993), which outlined the duties, responsibilities, and conduct expected of coast guard personnel. Additionally, internal policies and procedures specific to the coast guard non-officers school, such as disciplinary regulations and reporting protocols, provided the legal framework for the implementation and assessment of the DRS. These legal foundations ensured that the study's recommendations for policy improvements were compliant with the existing laws and standards.

### Conceptual Paradigm of the Study

The conceptual paradigm of the study followed an input-process-output (IPO) model. The input was consisted of the current levels of awareness, implementation practices, and the challenges faced by CGNOS personnel regarding the DRS. The process involved assessing these inputs through surveys, interviews, and analysis to determine the significant differences in perceptions between officers and non-officers and to identify specific challenges in the DRS implementation. Lastly, the output aimed to provide actionable policy recommendations to enhance the DRS, ensuring better awareness, more effective implementation, and reduced challenges in reporting delinquency.



**Figure 1.** Conceptual framework.

### **Significance of the Study**

The study held significance for various stakeholders within the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the broader maritime community.

- 1) **Philippine Coast Guard (PCG):** As the primary maritime law enforcement agency in the Philippines, the PCG stood to benefit from a thorough understanding of the effectiveness of its delinquency reporting system. Insights from the study could inspire policy improvements to enhance organizational integrity, discipline, and accountability within the PCG.
- 2) **CGNOS Personnel (Officers and Non-Officers):** Personnel at CGNOS would gain valuable insights into the current state of the DRS which included their level of awareness, implementation practices, and the challenges which they faced. This understanding could empower them to actively participate in improving the reporting system and promoting a culture of transparency and accountability within their institution.
- 3) **Policy Makers and Administrators:** Government officials who were responsible for maritime security and law enforcement policies could use the findings of the study to inform legislative and administrative reforms aimed at strengthening delinquency reporting mechanisms across the PCG and other relevant agencies.
- 4) **Maritime Stakeholders and the General Public:** Improved delinquency reporting within the PCG's contribution in promoting public trust and confidence in maritime law enforcement efforts. This would benefit all stakeholders which were included in the maritime activities, commercial shipping companies, fisherfolk, port operators, and the general public relying on safe and secure maritime transportation.
- 5) Furthermore, the researcher could greatly benefit from this study by gaining valuable insights into the awareness, implementation, and challenges of the Delinquency Report System (DRS) within the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS). By understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the current reporting framework, the researcher could propose policy enhancements that would improve the efficiency, fairness, and effectiveness of disciplinary measures. Additionally, the study contributed to the broader field of criminal justice education and maritime law enforcement which offered practical recommendations that could inform training programs, leadership development, and institutional accountability. Through the findings, the researcher would also build a strong foundation for future studies on disciplinary systems, organizational behavior, and leadership strategies, advancing knowledge in these critical areas.

### **Methodology**

#### **Research Design**

This study utilized a quantitative research design wherein it employed a descriptive-inferential approach. Quantitative descriptive research involved the collection and analysis of the numerical data to describe characteristics or phenomena within a specific group. This allowed the researcher to present a clear picture of the current situation regarding the Delinquency Report System (DRS) at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS). Techniques such as surveys and statistical summaries were used to gather this quantifiable information. The inferential aspect of the design involved the use of the collected data to make educated conclusions about the broader population from which the participants were drawn. By using inferential statistics, this study aimed to draw conclusions that extend beyond the immediate data collected from the CGNOS personnel.

This chosen design directly addressed the study's statement of the problem which allowed it for the systematic collection and analysis of data related to personnel's awareness, implementation, and challenges concerning the DRS. Specifically, the quantitative descriptive approach helped to answer the questions regarding the level of awareness and the level of implementation of the DRS among CGNOS personnel, as well as the challenges that they encountered. The inferential component allowed for a comparative analysis to determine if there were significant differences in awareness and implementation levels between officers and non-officer, thus, contributing to a deeper understanding of the system's functioning across different ranks.

#### **Research Method**

Quantitative data were collected through structured questionnaires to assess the level of awareness and implementation of the Delinquency Report System (DRS) among CGNOS personnel. Descriptive statistics, including frequencies, percentages, and means, were used to summarize the data, and provided insights into the current state of the DRS. Comparative statistical analyses were conducted to examine differences in the level of awareness and the level of implementation of the DRS between officers and non-officers within CGNOS. Specifically, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test (also known as the Wilcoxon rank sum test) was utilized to determine if there were significant differences between the two groups (officers and non-officers).

regarding these variables. Validity threats were minimized through several measures. The research instrument (questionnaire) was developed based on a review of relevant literature and input from subject matter experts within CGNOS to ensure its relevance and comprehensiveness. The tool underwent validation by a panel of experts familiar with maritime law enforcement, personnel training, and organizational behavior. A reliability test, specifically Cronbach's alpha coefficient, was conducted to assess the internal consistency of the questionnaire items, and the results indicated excellent reliability across most measured constructs. Ethical considerations were also strictly followed. This was to obtain informed consent from participants and ensured the confidentiality and voluntary participation of the respondents of this study to minimize potential biases and encouraged honest responses. Data cleaning and validation checks were performed prior to analysis to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the collected data.

## Population of the Study

**Table 1.** Population table.

| Group            | Description                         | Population size |
|------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Officers         | Personnel holding officer ranks     | 9               |
| Non-officers     | Personnel not holding officer ranks | 47              |
| Total population | All personnel at CGNOS              | 56              |

The study utilized a purposive sampling technique to select participants from the identified population. Purposive sampling allowed for the intentional selection of participants who possessed the relevant knowledge and experience related to the research objectives. By purposively selecting participants based on their roles and responsibilities within CGNOS, the study aimed to gather in-depth insights into the awareness, implementation, and challenges of the delinquency report system (DRS) from individuals with direct involvement and expertise in the subject matter.

## Locale of the Study

The study was conducted at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS), located in Coast Guard Base Taguig, Taguig City. CGNOS served as the specialized training institution within the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), mandated to provide professional development and skill enhancement programs for non-officer personnel. CGNOS served as the focal point for the implementation of the delinquency report system (DRS) among non-officer personnel within the Coast Guard Education, Training, and Doctrine Command (CGETDC). By conducting the study at CGNOS, the researcher directly assessed the awareness, implementation, and challenges associated with the DRS in a contextually relevant setting.

## Scope and Limitation of the Study

The scope of this study encompassed the assessment of awareness, implementation, and challenges related to the Delinquency Report System (DRS) among personnel at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS). Specifically, the study focused solely on understanding the level of awareness of DRS policies and procedures, evaluating the effectiveness of DRS implementation practices, and identifying the key challenges encountered in reporting delinquent behavior within CGNOS. Both officers and non-officers were included as participants to provide a comprehensive perspective across different ranks within the institution. The study was conducted within a specific timeframe, approximately from June/August 2024 to October 2024, with the proposal defense occurring in June 2024 and data gathering commencing after August 2024. The statistical analysis was completed by October 2024. Due to the availability of resources, the primary limitation of the study was the sample size of participants. While efforts were made to include a representative sample from CGNOS, the findings might not fully capture the diversity of perspectives across the entire institution.

## Data Gathering Tool/S

The research instrument used in the study was a structured questionnaire designed to assess the awareness, implementation, and challenges related to the Delinquency Report System (DRS) among personnel at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS). The contents of the research tool were derived from a review of relevant literature, including existing DRS policies, procedures, and guidelines within the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG).

Additionally, input from subject matter experts within CGNOS, such as senior officers and training instructors helped inform the development of questionnaire items to ensure its relevance and comprehensiveness for the study. The research tool underwent validation to ensure its reliability and validity. The validation process involved expert review by a panel of subject matter experts familiar with

maritime law enforcement, personnel training, and organizational behavior. A reliability test, such as Cronbach's alpha coefficient, was also conducted to assess the internal consistency of the questionnaire items. Based on the result of reliability testing conducted in Regional Training Center Taguig a separate unit from the coast guard non-officers school which was composed of 20 personnel:

**Table 2.** Test of reliability.

| Reliability statistics  |                       | Cronbach's alpha | Cronbach's alpha based on standardized items |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|--|
| Level of awareness      | Policy                | 0.905            | 0.912  |
|                         | Procedures            | 0.918            | 0.924  |
|                         | Treatment disposition | 0.913            | 0.912  |
|                         | Punishment            | 0.864            | 0.864  |
| Level of implementation | Policy                | 0.892            | 0.895  |
|                         | Procedures            | 0.972            | 0.972  |
|                         | Treatment disposition | 0.940            | 0.940  |
|                         | Punishment            | 0.934            | 0.938  |
| Challenges              | Policy                | 0.957            | 0.957  |
|                         | Procedures            | 0.885            | 0.885  |
|                         | Treatment disposition | 0.855            | 0.835  |
|                         | Punishment            | 0.948            | 0.949  |

The reliability statistics presented through Cronbach's alpha values indicated the internal consistency of various measured components within the study. Cronbach's alpha was commonly used to assess the reliability of scales, with higher values signifying greater consistency among the items within a construct. Generally, values above 0.70 were considered acceptable, while values above 0.90 indicated excellent reliability. For the level of awareness, the constructs of policy, procedures, treatment disposition, and punishment, all demonstrated strong internal consistency, with values ranging from 0.864 to 0.918. Procedures showed the highest level of reliability, suggesting that participants had consistent responses regarding procedural awareness. Punishment, while still within acceptable levels, exhibits slightly lower reliability, indicating some variability in responses.

In the level of implementation, all components-policy, procedures, treatment disposition, and punishment-displayed strong reliability, with values ranging from 0.892 to an exceptionally high 0.972 for procedures. The highest reliability observed in procedures suggested that this aspect of implementation was highly structured and consistently understood among respondents. For challenges, the reliability values also remained high with policy which showed an excellent Cronbach's alpha of 0.957 that reinforced the consistency of responses regarding policy-related challenges. Procedures and treatment disposition, while still reliable, exhibited comparatively lower values at 0.885 and 0.855, respectively. This might indicate slight variations in responses which would potentially reflect the differing experiences or perceptions of the respondents. Meanwhile, punishment held a very strong reliability score of 0.948 that confirmed that the participants shared consistent views on challenges associated with punishment.

Overall, the results indicated excellent reliability across all measured constructs, with particularly strong consistency in procedures within both awareness and implementation. The lower values within challenges-though still reliable-might suggest nuances in respondents' experiences that warrant further investigation. The findings stated above supported the reliability of the measurement tools used, ensuring confidence in the study's results and interpretations.

Below was the scale used to determine the following:

**Table 3.** Level of awareness and implementation in the delinquency report system (DRS) of the coast guard non-officer school (CGNOS).

| Level of awareness |                       | Level of implementation |                        |
|--------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Scale              | Verbal interpretation | Scale                   | Verbal interpretation  |
| 4                  | Extremely aware       | 4                       | Highly implemented     |
| 3                  | Aware                 | 3                       | Implemented            |
| 2                  | Moderately aware      | 2                       | Moderately implemented |
| 1                  | Not aware             | 1                       | Not implemented        |



### **Data Gathering Procedure**

The data-gathering process involved the following step-by-step procedures:

- ✦ Preparation Phase: The researcher coordinated with the authorities at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS) to obtain the necessary permissions and approvals for conducting the study. Ethical considerations, such as informed consent procedures and participant confidentiality, were carefully reviewed and adhered to.
- ✦ Questionnaire Distribution: The structured questionnaire was distributed to CGNOS personnel which included the officers and non-officers, either in physical or electronic format, based on their preference. Clear instructions on how to complete the questionnaire were provided which emphasized on the confidentiality and voluntary participation in this study.
- ✦ Data Collection: Participants were given a specified period to complete the questionnaire, typically, this ranged from one (1) to two (2) weeks. During this time, the research team was available to address any questions or concerns raised by participants regarding the questionnaire or the study objectives.
- ✦ Reminder and Follow-Up: Reminder emails or announcements were also sent to encourage participation and remind CGNOS personnel of the deadline for questionnaire submission. Follow-up communication was initiated with the non-respondents to encourage their participation and to ensure the representative's sample.
- ✦ Data Compilation: Completed questionnaires were collected and compiled by the research team for data analysis. Responses were interpreted and analyzed to a statistical software program for further processing and analysis.
- ✦ Quality Check: Prior to analysis, the researcher conducted a quality check to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data collected. Any inconsistencies or missing information were addressed through verification with participants, if necessary.

### **Treatment of the Data**

Descriptive statistics such as frequencies, percentages, and measures of central tendency and variability were computed to summarize the distribution of responses for each questionnaire item. For the Likert scale items, the use of the measure levels of awareness, implementation, and challenges, the median was utilized as a key measure of central tendency. This choice was justified by the nature of Likert scale data which was considered ordinal. While these scales provided ordered categories (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4), the intervals between these categories could not be assumed equal. The median, as a non-parametric statistic, was considered appropriate for ordinal data as it represented the middle value in an ordered dataset and did not rely on assumptions about equal distances between scale points which implied the normality standard, thus providing a more accurate representation of the typical response than the mean for this type of data. Means and standard deviations were also computed for descriptive purposes. This acknowledged the common practice in social science research while prioritizing the median for interpreting central tendency of the ordinal scale data. The data collected from the structured questionnaires underwent thorough treatment to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and validity of the findings. Initially, the collected responses were entered into a spreadsheet for organization and coding. Any missing or incomplete data were addressed through follow-up communication with participants.

Descriptive statistics were computed to summarize the distribution of responses for each questionnaire item that provided the insights into their level of awareness, implementation, and challenges related to the delinquency report system (DRS) among CGNOS personnel. Comparative analyses were conducted to examine differences between officers and non-officers in their perceptions and experiences with the DRS. When comparing two (2) samples or groups, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test, also known as the Wilcoxon rank sum test, was utilized. This test was appropriate for comparing two (2) independent groups, particularly when the assumption of normality was not met or not assumed. The Mann-Whitney U test assessed whether two (2) sampled groups were likely to be drawn from the same population by asking if the data in these two (2) populations had the same shape. In essence, researchers used this test to seek proof that the groups represented populations that differed in a certain variable (McClenaghan, 2024). The document did not explicitly state whether the assumptions of normality were tested before choosing the Mann-Whitney U test. Validity checks were also performed to identify outliers or inconsistent responses that might require further investigation or verification. Any anomalies detected during the data treatment process were carefully reviewed and addressed to ensure the integrity of the data analysis.

### **Ethical Considerations**

An informed consent form was utilized to obtain voluntary participation from CGNOS personnel. The form provided detailed information about the study's purpose, procedures, risks, benefits, and participants' rights.

Participants were required to read and understand the contents of the informed consent form before providing their consent to participate. By signing the form, participants indicated their willingness to take part in the study, with the assurance that their involvement was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time without repercussions.

For unwilling participants or those who declined to participate, their decision was fully respected. No coercion or pressure was exerted to compel participation. Additionally, confidentiality was maintained to ensure that non-participation did not result in any negative consequences for the individuals involved. While the study primarily focused on personnel at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS), consideration was given to the involvement of diverse ranks which included the senior officers, mid-grade officers, junior officers, and enlisted personnel. Efforts were made to ensure inclusivity and accessibility throughout the research process, such as providing accommodations for persons with disabilities during data collection and analysis. Additionally, sensitivity to gender, age, and cultural differences was maintained to promote equitable participation and representation in the study.

## Results and Discussion

### Level of Awareness in the Delinquency Report System of the Coast Guard Non-Officer School (CGNOS) in Terms of Various Factors

This section presented the answers for the first subproblem of the study. Table 4 presented the data on the level of awareness in the delinquency report system of the Coast Guard Non-Officer School (CGNOS) in terms of policy, procedures, treatment disposition and punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition.

**Table 4.** Level of awareness in the delinquency report system of the coast guard non-officer school in terms of various factors.

| Indicators/statement  | Officer     |           | Non-officer |           |
|---|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
|   | Med         | Int       | Med         | Int       |
| <b>Policy</b>   |             |           |             |           |
| 1) The PCG delinquency report system (DRS) applies to coast guard non-officers' school (CGNOS).   | 4.00        | FA        | 3.68        | FA        |
| 2) There are only particular personnel who are authorized to issue delinquency reports (DR).  | 4.00        | FA        | 3.49        | FA        |
| 3) Only service commanders/head of offices shall have the authority to dispense reports.  | 3.50        | FA        | 3.34        | FA        |
| 4) Delinquency reports (DR) are explained by the offender within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt.   | 4.00        | FA        | 3.63        | FA        |
| 5) The service commanders/heads of offices have the option to apply punishment under the DRS policy or under section XX (disciplinary powers of the commanding officers) of NHQ-PCG/CGIAS circular number 13-19 dated 18 November 2019. | 3.83        | FA        | 3.32        | FA        |
| 6) The PCG delinquency report system has an effect on your 201 file.  | 3.83        | FA        | 3.61        | FA        |
| 7) The offenses covered by the delinquency report (DR) are limited to minor offenses as outlined in the DR policy and light minor offenses under the disciplinary powers of commanding officers.  | 3.33        | FA        | 3.23        | A         |
| 8) That there are sanctions against abusive commanders in reporting/dispensing authorities in the implementation of the DR system.  | 3.33        | FA        | 3.16        | A         |
| 9) That the guide in rendering decisions over DRs is moral certainty.   | 3.83        | FA        | 3.13        | A         |
| 10) The PCG delinquent report (DR) forms and unit punishment books are provided by the coast guard human resource management command (CGHRMC).  | 3.33        | FA        | 3.09        | A         |
| <b>Overall</b>  | <b>3.83</b> | <b>FA</b> | <b>3.40</b> | <b>FA</b> |
| <b>Procedures</b>   |             |           |             |           |
| 1) The authorized personnel who personally know or witness an offense must prepare the DR stating the offender's name, time, place, and details of the offense.   | 3.25        | A         | 3.39        | FA        |
| 2) The delinquent report (DR) must be prepared in three (3) copies.   | 3.67        | FA        | 2.84        | A         |
| 3) The authorized personnel who will issue the DR (reporting  | 3.60        | FA        | 3.25        | A         |

|  |             |           |             |          |
|--|-------------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| authority) must submit accomplished DR forms to their commanding officers through admin officers for processing.   |             |           |             |          |
| 4) That the original form is forwarded without delay to the offender for him/her to explain within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt while the other two (2) copies shall be retained by the dispensing authority. | 3.60        | FA        | 3.29        | FA       |
| 5) The DRs are addressed with appropriate punishment within five (5) calendar days upon receipt by the dispensing authority.   | 3.00        | A         | 3.08        | A        |
| 6) There is a provision about an offender who is not organic personnel to the reporting authority.   | 1.75        | NA        | 2.72        | A        |
| 7) The dispensing authority must forward a written notice and a copy of the original DR (with an explanation) to the reporting authority within five (5) calendar days.  | 3.25        | A         | 3.14        | A        |
| 8) That the DR with a valid explanation is revoked by the dispensing authority.  | 3.00        | A         | 3.24        | A        |
| 9) If DRs are revoked five (5) times without valid reasons, the dispensing authority must validate this with the concerned personnel.  | 1.60        | NA        | 2.85        | A        |
| 10) The dispensing authority can charge for countenancing or tolerating an offender in revoking DR issued five (5) times.  | 1.80        | MA        | 2.81        | A        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>3.00</b> | <b>A</b>  | <b>3.10</b> | <b>A</b> |
| <b>Treatment disposition</b>   |             |           |             |          |
| 1) The 1 <sup>st</sup> DR incurred by erring personnel must serve as a warning only.   | 3.33        | FA        | 3.29        | FA       |
| 2) The personnel must correct his offense/defects immediately and feedback on the same to the reporting authority/awarding authority.  | 3.50        | FA        | 3.34        | FA       |
| 3) 2 <sup>nd</sup> DR with the same or different nature of offense incurred within a period of 3 months by the erring personnel must have a specific punishment as prescribed in the policy.                         | 3.00        | A         | 3.08        | A        |
| 4) The 3 <sup>rd</sup> DR with the same or different nature of offense incurred within a period of 3 months by the erring personnel must have a specific punishment as prescribed in the policy.                     | 3.40        | FA        | 3.08        | A        |
| 5) That the commission of acts constituting minor or light offenses three (3) times regardless if the same is committed within a three-month period must be considered a less grave offense under PCG policy.        | 2.50        | MA        | 3.06        | A        |
| 6) DRs that are revoked will not be included in the counting of DR.  | 2.80        | A         | 3.11        | A        |
| 7) That the DRs issued to coast guard personnel undergoing basic course and advanced course or any schooling must form part of the DR system of PCG.   | 3.17        | A         | 3.00        | A        |
| 8) There are separate DR systems in PCG training institutions specifically for CGOC, CGMC, and other basic training.   | 3.40        | A         | 3.08        | A        |
| 9) The PCG DR system is applicable during the conduct of Saturday ranks and barrack inspection.  | 3.25        | FA        | 3.28        | FA       |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>3.40</b> | <b>FA</b> | <b>3.18</b> | <b>A</b> |
| <b>Punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition of delinquency report (DR)</b>  |             |           |             |          |
| 1) The withholding of DR can be held liable for countenancing or tolerating an offender to the prejudice of good order and discipline.   | 2.75        | A         | 3.05        | A        |
| 2) The delaying of DR can be held liable for countenancing or tolerating an offender to the prejudice of good order and discipline.  | 2.75        | A         | 3.00        | A        |
| 3) The inaction of DR can be held liable for countenancing or tolerating an offender to the prejudice of good order and discipline.  | 2.75        | A         | 3.08        | A        |
| 4) Every CGNOS personnel must be duty-bound to report violations observed during their tour of duty or in the exercise of their official function.   | 3.60        | FA        | 3.22        | A        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>2.75</b> | <b>A</b>  | <b>3.02</b> | <b>A</b> |
| <b>*Legend: FA: Fully aware, A: Aware, MA: Moderately aware, NA: Not aware</b>   |             |           |             |          |

Based on the data presented in Table 4, the study revealed that the level of awareness regarding the Delinquency Report System (DRS) among personnel at the Coast Guard Non-Officers School (CGNOS) varied, ranging from "fully aware" to "not aware" depending on the specific aspect of the system examined (policy, procedures, treatment disposition, and punishment for withholding/delaying/inaction). This overall finding indicated that while personnel possessed some general knowledge, their understanding was not consistently complete which suggested the potential inconsistencies in how the system was understood and applied. This finding resonated with the broader national context that highlighted the gaps in terms of the training and awareness programs regarding the matter, which could lead to the inconsistent rule application and the lack of accountability within paramilitary organizations. The highest levels of awareness for both officers and non-officers were consistently observed in fundamental areas such as the DRS applying to CGNOS wherein the existence of authorized personnel to issue reports and the requirement for offender explanation within 24 hours were presented. These findings suggested that the most basic and frequently encountered aspects of the DRS were well-understood, indicating successful communication of the system's fundamental framework and initial steps. This high awareness of fundamental procedures was aligned with the general understanding expected in a uniformed service and corroborated the importance of clearly communicating basic procedural rights, such as the 24-hour explanation period, which was a key procedural right in non-judicial punishment systems (Absher, 2022).

In contrast, the lowest levels of awareness were found in more specific or less frequently encountered aspects of the DRS. For officers, this included procedures for validating DRs revoked multiple times without valid reasons and provisions for offenders who were not organic to the reporting authority. Non-officers also showed lower awareness regarding the source of DR forms and provisions for non-organic offenders. Additionally, awareness of the punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction in disposition was generally lower for both groups. These low awareness levels in specific procedural details and accountability measures were significant concerns of this study. It suggested the potential errors or inconsistencies in processing complex cases and a gap in the system's ability to enforce accountability among those administering it. This could lead to the unintentional non-compliance, delays, and a perception that inaction carried no repercussions. Thus, the undermining the integrity and effectiveness of the disciplinary framework would be affected. These findings corroborated challenges were identified in the study. This included the difficulties in issuing reports for personnel not assigned to CGNOS and the ambiguities in policy and procedures, and the alignment of these policies and procedures with the challenge of ensuring accountability among reporting and dispensing authorities. As discussed in the background, factors like the fear of retribution (Pulkkinen and Writer, 2024) and organizational issues (Worsley, 2023) could contribute to underreporting and to the reluctance to engage with the disciplinary system which potentially exacerbated by a lack of clear awareness regarding accountability mechanisms within the system itself.

In terms of the treatment disposition of the delinquency report system, the findings showed that the awareness of both officers and non-officers ranged from fully aware and moderately aware of the report system. This involved the knowledge and understanding of the personnel that they must correct his offense/defects immediately and feedback on the same to the reporting authority/awarding authority (3.50), that the 3<sup>rd</sup> DR with the same or different nature of offense incurred within a period of 3 months by the erring personnel must have a specific punishment as prescribed in the policy (3.40), and that there were separate DR systems in PCG training institutions specifically for CGOC, CGMC, and other basic training (3.40) are the highest for officers.

Furthermore, the personnel must correct his offense/defects immediately and feedback on the same to the reporting authority/awarding authority (3.34), the 1<sup>st</sup> DR incurred by erring personnel must serve as a warning only (3.29), and the PCG DR system was applicable during the conduct of Saturday ranks and barrack inspection (3.28) were the highest for non-officers. Meanwhile, the lowest score for officers was 2.50 and states that the commission of acts constituting minor or light offenses three (3) times regardless if the same was committed within a three-month period must be considered a less grave offense under PCG policy. For non-officers, with a score of 3.00, the DRs issued to coast guard personnel undergoing basic course and advanced course or any schooling must form part of the DR System of PCG was the lowest. The results indicated that both officers and non-officers were fully and were moderately aware of the delinquency report system when it came to the treatment disposition. As noted by Phiri *et al.*, (2023) and Wentzlof (2024), while carrying out several tasks that needed integrity and good judgment. Law enforcement officials must also exercise their power over the general people. Since a lot of this job was carried out without management's direct supervision wherein certain officers could be tempted to act inappropriately in certain circumstances. Prevalence statistics indicated that police's wrongdoing was uncommon. However, any

degree of wrongdoing mattered because of the impact it might have done on the lawsuits, media relations, and citizen trust. Therefore, it was essential that personnel understand that they needed to rectify their transgressions or flaws right away.

Lastly, in terms of analyzing the report system for punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition, the results showed that the awareness of both officers and non-officers ranged from fully aware and aware of the delinquency report system. Specifically, this pertained to their knowledge and understanding that every CGNOS personnel must be duty-bound to report violations observed during their tour of duty or in the exercise of their official function being the highest for both the officers (3.60) and non-officers (3.22). Li *et al.*, (2017) further supported this conclusion by asserting that when a service member suspected a fellow service member of committing a crime, they must report the incident through their chain of command. The victim, in other words, must report straight to their commander. The commander was then expected to investigate. Other command personnel might also conduct the investigation, contingent on the severity and level of the charge.

As stated by Abad *et al.*, (2023), the personnel of the Philippine Coast Guard were essential on land and in the water. Their primary duties included protecting marine resources, the environment, and people and property at sea. They also assisted in the enforcement of maritime laws that were under Philippine jurisdiction. Because of the significance of these personnel, the delinquency report system was also essential since it handled small violations that the employees themselves had committed. Additionally, the system was a preventive measure intended to reduce the frequency of personnel misdemeanors by implementing on-the-spot corrections, which eliminated or at least mitigate the root causes of such misconduct, and to encourage and foster within officers and non-officers the importance of consistent observance of proper decorum. This assessed the degree of CGNOS awareness in the delinquent report system which was therefore crucial, taking into account a number of factors which included policy, procedures, treatment disposition, and penalties for withholding, delaying, and failing to dispose of DR.

#### Comparative Analysis in the Level of Awareness of the Delinquency Report System Along the Various Aspects Among the Type of Respondents

The answers to the study's second subproblem were provided in this section. The comparative examination of respondents' levels of awareness of the delinquent report system across different areas is shown in Table 5.

**Table 5.** Comparative analysis in the level of awareness of the delinquency report system along the various aspects among the type of respondents.

| Delinquency report system   | Type of respondent |     |             |     | Mann-Whitney Z-value | Test statistics p-value |
|---|--------------------|-----|-------------|-----|----------------------|-------------------------|
|   | Officer            |     | Non-officer |     |                      |                         |
|   | Med                | Int | Med         | Int |                      |                         |
| Policy  | 3.83               | FA  | 3.40        | FA  | -1.888               | 0.059                   |
| Procedures  | 3.00               | A   | 3.10        | A   | -0.277               | 0.782                   |
| Treatment disposition   | 3.40               | FA  | 3.18        | A   | -0.485               | 0.627                   |
| Punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition of delinquency report (DR)  | 2.75               | A   | 3.02        | A   | 0.738                | 0.461                   |
| *Significant @ ≤ 0.05; Legend: FA: Fully aware, A: Aware, MA: Moderately aware, NA: Not aware |                    |     |             |     |                      |                         |

Table 5 presented the comparative analysis in the level of awareness of the delinquency report system along the various aspects among the type of respondents. The various factors included the policy, procedure, treatment disposition, and punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition of delinquency report, and the type of respondents were between officers and non-officers. To determine if there was a significant difference between the perceptions of officers and non-officers, a non-parametric test Mann-Whitney was conducted, wherein a p-value of less than or equal to 0.050 would indicate a significant difference. The results presented in the table above were indications that there was no significant difference in the awareness of the various delinquency report systems between both officers and non-officers. As stated by the United States Coast Guard Academy (2022), there were differences between being an officer in the coast guard and any other branch of the military. As a law enforcement officer and sailor, defender and humanitarian, regulator, environmental steward, diplomat, and coast guardian, a coast guard officer was expected to fulfill their duties. The coast guard provided numerous opportunities for professional specialization, which was not surprisingly given the large number of positions available.

Moreover, officers and enlisted military members had different duties, obligations, and requirements. Within the military, enlisted troops had specialties. They carry out specific duties and possessed the know-how, aptitude, and skills necessary to guarantee the accomplishment of their unit's objectives. Enlisted personnel were managed by officers. They provided commands, allocated duties, and planned missions. They played a leadership role as strategists, influencers, and problem solvers (ASVAB Career Exploration Program, 2024). The results, however, made it abundantly evident that there was no difference in awareness between officers and non-officers, even though there was a notable disparity between the two groups. This was due to their commanders' means of addressing minor infractions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which was crucial to consider the opinions of both officers and non-officers when evaluating the effectiveness of the delinquency report system for personnel. Despite being administrative in nature, NJP could nonetheless had a major detrimental effect on a service member's career, including their impact, process, and purpose.

### Level of Implementation of the Delinquency Report System of the Coast Guard Non-Officers School Among the Given Variables

In this section, the answers to the study's third subproblem were presented. Table 6 showed how well the coast guard non-officer school's delinquency report system was being implemented in terms of policy, procedure, treatment disposition, and sanctions for failing to act, delaying, or withholding delinquency report disposition.

**Table 6.** Level of implementation of the delinquency report system of the coast guard non-officers school among the given variables.

| Indicators/statement   | Officer     |          | Non-officer |          |
|--|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
|  | Med         | Int      | Med         | Int      |
| <b>Policy</b>  |             |          |             |          |
| 1) The PCG delinquency report system (DRS) is applied to all CGNOS personnel regardless of rank.   | 2.60        | I        | 3.18        | I        |
| 2) Authorized CGNOS personnel report and issues delinquency to minor offense committed by other CGNOS personnel.   | 3.00        | I        | 2.97        | I        |
| 3) Unit commander has the authority to impose appropriate punishment or revoked delinquency report.  | 3.67        | HI       | 3.44        | HI       |
| 4) The period of explanation by the offender is within twenty-four (24) hours.   | 3.83        | HI       | 3.36        | HI       |
| 5) Option of commanders in applying punishments.   | 3.20        | I        | 3.26        | HI       |
| 6) The CGNOS admin officer shall cause the collection and enter the DRs in the unit punishment book.   | 3.20        | I        | 3.23        | I        |
| 7) Guide to the commanders in the rendering decisions over dispensing DRs.   | 3.20        | I        | 3.11        | I        |
| 8) Production and control of DR forms and units punishment book by the CGHRMC.   | 2.60        | I        | 3.03        | I        |
| 9) Requisition of DRs and unit punishment book.  | 1.80        | MI       | 3.00        | I        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>3.00</b> | <b>I</b> | <b>3.18</b> | <b>I</b> |
| <b>Procedures</b>  |             |          |             |          |
| 1) Preparation of the DR stating the name of the offender, time and place of the offense, and the offense committed.   | 3.67        | HI       | 3.42        | HI       |
| 2) Preparation of triplicate copies of DR.   | 2.75        | I        | 2.94        | I        |
| 3) Submission of personnel issuing the DR (reporting authority) of the accomplished DR forms to the superintendent of CGNOS through the admin officer for processing.  | 3.00        | I        | 3.00        | I        |
| 4) Furnishing a copy of the original without delay to the offender for him/her to explain within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt while the other two (2) copies shall be retained by the dispensing authority. | 2.75        | I        | 2.94        | I        |
| 5) Submission of the explained DRs to the dispensing authority by the offender.  | 3.60        | HI       | 3.28        | HI       |
| 6) The awarding authority is given five (5) days to dispense DR to the offender and the admin officer through a channel.   | 3.25        | I        | 3.11        | I        |
| 7) A receipt of the dispensed DR is required to be signed by the offender in person.   | 3.40        | HI       | 3.20        | I        |

|  |             |           |             |          |
|--|-------------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| 8) The superintendent of CGNOS must forward the accomplished DR forms (triplicate copy) to the unit of the offender through a channel if the offender is not organic to CGNOS.                           | 2.60        | I         | 2.90        | I        |
| 9) Collection of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> copy (yellow) of all awarded DRs by the admin officer of CGNOS on a monthly basis.  | 2.00        | MI        | 2.68        | I        |
| 10) Submission of the collected 3 <sup>rd</sup> copy (yellow) of all awarded DRs to CGIG-IAS through the provost marshal for consolidation and recording.  | 1.80        | MI        | 2.65        | I        |
| 11) Reporting/awarding authorities who are found abusive in the implementation of the policy on DRS.   | 2.33        | MI        | 2.97        | I        |
| 12) DRs revoked five (5) times without valid reason will be validated by the dispensing authority and be called by the commanding officer.   | 1.80        | MI        | 3.03        | I        |
| 13) DRs revoked five (5) times with valid reason will be validated by the dispensing authority and be called by the service/unit/operating commander.  | 1.80        | MI        | 2.81        | I        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>2.40</b> | <b>MI</b> | <b>2.94</b> | <b>I</b> |
| <b>Treatment disposition</b>   |             |           |             |          |
| 1) The 1 <sup>st</sup> DR incurred by erring personnel will serve as a warning only.   | 3.67        | HI        | 3.27        | HI       |
| 2) The personnel will correct his offense/defects immediately and feedback on the same to the reporting authority/awarding authority.  | 3.17        | I         | 3.15        | I        |
| 3) The 2 <sup>nd</sup> DR with the same or different nature of offense incurred within a period of 3 months by the erring personnel will have a specific punishment as prescribed in the policy.         | 2.60        | I         | 2.90        | I        |
| 4) The 3 <sup>rd</sup> DR with the same or different nature of offense incurred within a period of 3 months by the erring personnel shall have a specific graver punishment as prescribed in the policy. | 2.60        | I         | 2.92        | I        |
| 5) The commission of acts constituting minor or light offenses three (3) times regardless if the same is committed within a three-month period will be considered a less grave offense under PCG policy. | 2.00        | MI        | 2.95        | I        |
| 6) DRs that are revoked will not be included in the counting of DR.  | 3.40        | HI        | 2.97        | I        |
| 7) The DRs issued to coast guard personnel undergoing basic course and advance course or any schooling will form part of the DR system of PCG.   | 3.00        | I         | 3.06        | I        |
| 8) Separate DR system in PCG training institutions specifically for CGOC, CGMC, and other basic training.  | 3.67        | HI        | 3.16        | I        |
| 9) The DR system is applied in the conduct of Saturday ranks and barrack inspection.   | 2.80        | I         | 2.91        | I        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>3.40</b> | <b>FI</b> | <b>3.00</b> | <b>I</b> |
| <b>Punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition</b>   |             |           |             |          |
| 1) Providing a punishment to CGNOS personnel who withhold DR.  | 2.33        | MI        | 2.75        | I        |
| 2) Providing a punishment to CGNOS personnel who cause a delay in disposing of DR.   | 2.33        | MI        | 2.83        | I        |
| 3) Providing a punishment to CGNOS personnel who failed to act on DR.  | 2.33        | MI        | 2.82        | I        |
| 4) CGNOS personnel report violations observed during their tour of duty or in the exercise of their official function.   | 2.33        | MI        | 2.91        | I        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>2.33</b> | <b>MI</b> | <b>2.92</b> | <b>I</b> |
| <b>*Legend: HI: Highly implemented, I: Implemented, MI: Moderately implemented, NI: Not implemented</b>  |             |           |             |          |

Table 6 presented the level of implementation in the delinquency report system of the coast guard non-officer school in terms of policy, procedure, treatment disposition, and punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition of delinquency report. When looking at the treatment disposition of the delinquency report system, it showed that the level of implementation of both officers and non-officers ranged from highly implemented to moderately implemented. When looking at the perception of officers, the highest factors included that the 1<sup>st</sup> DR incurred by erring personnel served as a warning only (3.67), separate DR system in PCG training institutions specifically for CGOC, CGMC, and other basic training (3.67), and DRs that were revoked would not be included in the counting of DR (3.40). For non-officers, the highest factor

included the 1<sup>st</sup> DR incurred by erring personnel would serve as a warning only (3.27), that separate DR system in PCG training institutions specifically for CGOC, CGMC, and other basic training (3.16), and that the personnel corrected his offense/defects immediately and feedback on the same to the reporting authority/awarding authority (3.15).

However, for officers, 2.0 was the lowest score which indicated that the commission of acts constituting minor or light offenses three (3) times regardless of if the same was committed within a three-month period which considered a less grave offense under PCG policy. On the other hand, for non-officers, the 2<sup>nd</sup> DR with the same or different nature of offense incurred within a period of 3 months by the erring personnel would have a specific punishment as prescribed in the policy was the lowest with a score of 2.90. Accordingly, the BMI was permitted to carry out investigations to assist judicial procedures concerning maritime accidents and the behavior of marine personnel, as asserted by Ferre (2022) and Maneerin (2023). The BMI investigation's report was given to the bureau of customs commissioner. Based on the BMI's recommendations and findings, the commissioner had the authority to cancel or to suspend any marine certificate or penalize a licensed marine officer for professional misconduct, incompetence, or intoxicating habits. It was crucial to remember that the initial DR caused by the negligent staff used as a warning.

Moreover, upon reviewing the delinquency report system's policy, it showed that the level of implementation of both officers and non-officers ranged from highly implemented to moderately implemented. When looking at the perception of officers, the highest factors included that the period of explanation by the offender was within twenty-four (24) hours (3.83), unit commander had the authority to impose appropriate punishment or revoked delinquency report (3.67), option of commanders in applying punishments; the CGNOS admin officer caused the collection and entered the DRs in the unit punishment book; and guided to the commanders in the rendering decisions over dispensing DRs (3.20). For non-officers, the highest include the unit commander had the authority to impose appropriate punishment or revoked delinquency report (3.44), the period of explanation by the offender was within twenty-four (24) hours (3.36), and the option of commanders in applying punishments (3.26). On the other hand, the lowest score for officers was 1.80, indicating requisition of DRs and unit punishment book. For non-officers, authorized CGNOS personnel report and issued delinquency report the minor offense committed by other CGNOS personnel (2.97) got the lowest score. The conclusion that a commander was the only one with the power to administer nonjudicial punishment was further supported by Onesto-Person (2018).

For procedure of the delinquency report system, the findings showed that the implementation of both officers and non-officers ranged from highly implemented and moderately implemented of the report system, with the preparation of the DR stating the name of the offender, time and place of the offense, and the offense committed (3.67), the submission of the explained DRs to the dispensing authority by the offender (3.60), and that a receipt of the dispensed DR was required to be signed by the offender in person (3.40) were the highest for officers. On the other hand, for non-officers, the preparation of the DR stating the name of the offender, time and place of the offense, and the offense committed (3.42), the submission of the explained DRs to the dispensing authority by the offender (3.28), and a receipt of the dispensed DR is required to be signed by the offender in person (3.20) were the highest values. For officers, submission of the collected 3<sup>rd</sup> copy (yellow) of all awarded DRs to CGIG-IAS through the provost marshal for consolidation and recording, DRs revoked five (5) times without valid reason were validated by the dispensing authority and was called by the commanding officer, and DRs revoked five (5) times with valid reason validated by the dispensing authority and be called by the service/unit/operating commander all with a score of 1.80, were the lowest while for non-officers, submission of the collected 3<sup>rd</sup> copy (yellow) of all awarded DRs to CGIG-IAS through the provost marshal for consolidation and recording (2.65) got the lowest score. According to the study by Alincastre and Dalugdog (2022), the E-project system, which was accessible to all stations nationwide and could not be falsified, was one of the latest technologies that the Philippine National Police (PNP) had acquired to make incident recording easier and more efficient. This technology could also help with the evaluation and with the interpretation of criminal events in the Philippines. Using computerized crime mapping technologies, law enforcement agencies could analyze and could correlate data sources to provide a thorough picture of crime episodes and related factors in a neighborhood or other geographic area (Jurado and Quinto, 2023).

Lastly, when analyzing the report system for punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition, the results showed that the level of implementation of officers were all moderately implemented while all were implemented for non-officers. For officers, all the four (4) statements and indicators got a score of 2.33 while for non-officers, providing a punishment to CGNOS personnel who caused a delay in



disposing of DR (2.83) got the highest value. It was crucial that all conditions of the navy's assignment be fulfilled, and the Indonesian Navy's personnel utilization strategy was applied with the greatest care to preserve harmony and balance (Gunawan *et al.*, 2022). Until policy decisions specified or identified the goals and objectives, policy implementation would not take place. Therefore, research on policy implementation was necessary to ascertain the efficacy and productivity of processes that improved the performance to optimize the tasks that the navy was allocated because of organizational needed and assigned impediments. Considering this, it was extremely important to determine if the coast guard's present delinquency report system was being implemented properly in terms of policy, procedure, treatment disposition, and punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition. The findings of the study indicated that officers' and non-officers' understanding of the report system's policy, treatment disposition, and process ranged from highly implemented to moderately implemented. Moreover, the findings of the analysis of the report system for punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition indicated that, although all were implemented for non-officers, officers' knowledge was minimally implemented.

### Comparative Analysis in the Level of Implementation of the Delinquency Report System Along the Various Aspects Among the Type of Respondents

The answers to the study's fourth subproblem were provided in this section. The comparative analysis of the delinquent report system's implementation level across the different featured across the different types of respondents is shown in Table 7.

**Table 7.** Comparative analysis in the level of implementation of the delinquency report system along the various aspects among the type of respondents.

| Delinquency report system  | Type of respondent |     |             |     | Mann-Whitney Z-value | Test statistics p-value |
|--|--------------------|-----|-------------|-----|----------------------|-------------------------|
|  | Officer            |     | Non-officer |     |                      |                         |
|  | Med                | Int | Med         | Int |                      |                         |
| Policy   | 3.00               | I   | 3.17        | I   | -0.458               | 0.647                   |
| Procedures   | 2.40               | MI  | 2.94        | I   | -1.416               | 0.157                   |
| Treatment disposition  | 3.40               | HI  | 3.00        | I   | -1.104               | 0.270                   |
| Punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition of delinquency report (DR)                                 | 2.33               | MI  | 2.92        | I   | -1.003               | 0.316                   |
| *Significant @ $\leq 0.05$ ; Legend: HI: Highly implemented, I: Implemented, MI: Moderately implemented, NI: Not implemented |                    |     |             |     |                      |                         |

Table 7 presented the comparative analysis in the level of implementation of the delinquency report system along the various aspects among the type of respondents. The various factors included policy, procedure, treatment disposition, and punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition of delinquency report, and the type of respondents were between officers and non-officers. To determine if there was a significant difference between the perceptions of officers and non-officers, a non-parametric test Mann-Whitney was conducted, wherein a p-value of less than or equal to 0.050 would indicate a significant difference. The results presented above were an indication that there was no significant difference in the implementation of the various delinquency report systems between both officers and non-officers.

According to the results of this study, officers and non-officers implemented the delinquency report system at nearly same levels. Among other things, the terms of service were another distinction between officers and enlisted personnel. All enlisted troops, regardless of pay grade, were employed by the coast guard under an array of fixed-term contracts until recently. This provided individual enlistees with a certain level of safety and stability to the personnel system. It was still uncommon to fire an enlisted person regardless of pay grade before the conclusion of their enlistment. This implied that they might be fired at any moment and without cause. These centuries-old terms of service were the origin of the terms "enlist," "warrant," and "commission," which could still be used to refer to the position of individuals in the military hierarchy (Military.com, 2023). However, the study's results made it abundantly clear that, even though officers and non-officers differed in a number of ways, there was no discernible difference in how these two (2) groups implement the delinquency report system. For this reason, the study was essential, particularly for the military.

### Challenges Faced by the Personnel in the Implementation of Delinquency Report System

This section contained the answers to the fifth subproblem of the research. Table 8 displayed the difficulties that the personnel encountered when putting the delinquent report system into place.

**Table 8.** Challenges faced by the personnel in the implementation of delinquency report system.

| Indicators/statement   | Officer     |           | Non-officer |          |
|--|-------------|-----------|-------------|----------|
|  | Med         | Int       | Med         | Int      |
| <b>Policy</b>  |             |           |             |          |
| 1) There are words or terms that appear once in a while that I do not recognize or they are unclearly defined making it hard for me to understand DRS.       | 3.00        | A         | 2.85        | A        |
| 2) I hesitate to issue a disciplinary report (DR) against my superior even though I am on duty because I'm worried that they might retaliate.                | 2.50        | FA        | 3.16        | A        |
| 3) The authorized persons who issue delinquency reports are selective on whom they report and give a delinquency report.                                     | 2.20        | FA        | 3.00        | A        |
| 4) I've seen cases where admin officers haven't included punishments for DRs in the 201 file for consideration.  | 2.50        | FA        | 2.65        | A        |
| 5) The CGNOS office seems neither interested nor supportive of DRS.  | 2.00        | FA        | 2.65        | A        |
| 6) Some authorized personnel don't follow established policies when enforcing disciplinary actions; so, punishment becomes arbitrary and selective at times. | 2.50        | FA        | 2.66        | A        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>2.50</b> | <b>FA</b> | <b>2.81</b> | <b>A</b> |
| <b>Procedures</b>  |             |           |             |          |
| 1) Insufficient training is provided to effectively implement the DRS.   | 3.00        | A         | 3.00        | A        |
| 2) Inadequate supply of delinquency report forms obstructs the policy being effectively executed.  | 2.50        | A         | 2.76        | A        |
| 3) The DRS system is too complex and time-consuming to use.  | 1.60        | D         | 2.58        | A        |
| 4) The five-day timeframe for the commander to assign punishment feels very long.  | 1.60        | D         | 2.53        | A        |
| 5) There is inadequate support and resources for maintaining the DRS.  | 3.00        | A         | 2.81        | A        |
| 6) It's difficult for me to issue a DR for personnel who are not assigned in the CGNOS office.   | 2.50        | FA        | 3.06        | A        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>2.50</b> | <b>FA</b> | <b>2.82</b> | <b>A</b> |
| <b>Treatment/disposition of DRs</b>  |             |           |             |          |
| 1) Authorized personnel to issue DR always resort to warnings, even for second or repeated offenses.   | 3.00        | A         | 2.84        | A        |
| 2) Admin officers include revoked DRs in the count, which goes against the guidelines for DR treatment/disposition.  | 2.67        | A         | 2.63        | A        |
| 3) The PCG delinquency report system is being used for trainees in the regional training centers.  | 3.20        | A         | 3.14        | A        |
| 4) Punishments for DRs can be harsh, even for minor offenses.  | 1.60        | D         | 2.69        | A        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>2.50</b> | <b>FA</b> | <b>2.85</b> | <b>A</b> |
| <b>Punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition</b>   |             |           |             |          |
| 1) There are no clear parameters for withholding of disposition.   | 2.75        | A         | 2.74        | A        |
| 2) There are no clear parameters for delaying of disposition   | 2.75        | A         | 2.71        | A        |
| 3) There are no clear parameters for inaction of disposition.  | 2.80        | A         | 2.74        | A        |
| 4) There's no clear process for reporting personnel who will withhold the disposition of PCG delinquency report.   | 2.20        | FA        | 2.88        | A        |
| 5) There's no clear process for reporting personnel who will delay the disposition of PCG delinquency report.  | 2.50        | A         | 2.84        | A        |
| 6) There's no clear process for reporting personnel who will not act on the disposition of PCG delinquency report.   | 2.50        | A         | 2.90        | A        |
| <b>Overall</b>   | <b>2.67</b> | <b>A</b>  | <b>2.82</b> | <b>A</b> |
| *Legend: SA: Strongly agree, A: Agree, FA: Fairly agree, D: Disagree   |             |           |             |          |

Table 8 presented the challenges faced by the personnel in the implementation of the delinquency report system of the coast guard non-officer school in terms of policy, procedure, treatment disposition, and punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition of delinquency report. According to the United States Coast Guard Academy (2022), every two (2) to four (4) years, the coast guard gave its officer corps new, more challenging tasks to keep them motivated. Every assignment offered fresh responsibilities, settings, and special chances that led to the quick development, progress, and the chance to lead a meaningful life. Moreover, the steadfast dedication to the protection and welfare of the maritime realm was

demonstrated by the Philippine Coast Guards' execution of maritime laws under Philippine authority. They traversed a dynamic range of tasks and obstacles in the unrelenting pursuit of their responsibilities, which served as the furnace for their experiences. These protectors of the shore voluntarily put themselves at danger when dealing with severe weather and dangerous circumstances, answering distress called with the sole goal of saving lives. Their experiences in challenging situations demonstrated their tenacity and strength and underscored the significant influence of their work on the people they assisted as well as the larger maritime ecosystem. Beyond the short-term difficulties, the staff members enjoyed the long-term rewards of giving unwavering assistance to individuals in need, which reverberated throughout their lifetime dedication. The Philippine Coast Guard personnel's training, experience, and unwavering dedication enabled them to overcome obstacles and carry out their duties as the country's coast guardians (Empinado *et al.*, 2023).

There were difficulties for both officers and non-officers in properly implementing their delinquency report system. When looking at the procedures of the delinquency report system, it showed that the personnel's assessment on the challenges on implementing the delinquency report system range from agree to disagree. When looking at the assessment of officers, they saw that the DRS system was too complex and time-consuming to use (1.60) and the five-day timeframe for the commander to assign punishment feels very long (1.60) were both factors they disagreed in being a challenge to the implementation of the delinquency report system. Meanwhile, non-officers agreed that there was difficulty to issue a DR for personnel who were not assigned in the CGNOS office (3.06), insufficient training was provided to effectively implement the DRS (3.00), and there was inadequate support and resources for maintaining the DRS (2.81). The lowest score for officers was 1.60, "the DRS system was too complex and time-consuming to use" and "the five-day timeframe for the commander to assigned punishment feels very long". Meanwhile, for non-officers, the five-day timeframe for the commander to assign punishment felt very long (2.53) got the lowest score. The need of strong leadership within the Philippine Coast Guard was highlighted by Berbie's (2024) study, which focused on creating a competency manual for commanding officers.

This study provided information about the dynamics of leadership that could affect officers' reporting practices. The competency manual was a special tool for structured, incremental skill development that helped PCG Commanding Officers better manage the demanding duties associated with their roles. Effective implementation that included conducting frequent assessments, establishing opportunities for continuous improvement, and incorporating the handbook into PCG's training programs. The goal of this strategic approach was to help PCG Commanding Officers developed into highly qualified leaders who could effectively protect Philippine maritime interests. Considering this, inadequate training was required to execute the DRS successfully, and appropriate resources and assistance were required to maintain the DRS. Moreover, it had been discovered that officers and non-officers find it difficult to issue a DR for PCG personnel who were not assigned to the CGNOS office and that there was not enough training available to carry out the DRS efficiently. As found by Empinado *et al.*, (2023) in a study they conducted, it was crucial for coast guard rescuers to have ongoing training and skill development. The efficacy and professional development of rescue professionals could be enhanced by putting in place specialized training programs, utilizing the most recent rescue procedures, and offering frequent opportunities for skill improvement. This implied that funding continuous training programs improved the rescuers' ability to manage a variety of difficulties which enhanced both their overall effectiveness and the success of rescue operations. Furthermore, because trainees in regional training centers used the PCG DRS and authorized personnel always used warnings to issue DRs, even for second or repeated offenses, both officers and non-officers faced a variety of difficulties in treating or disposing of DRs.

On the other hand, upon analyzing the policy of the delinquency report system, it showed that the personnel's assessment on the challenges on implementing the delinquency report system ranged from agree to fairly agree. The officers see that there were words or terms that appear once in a while that they did not recognize or they were unclearly defined making it hard for them to understand DRS (3.00) as well as hesitated to issue a disciplinary report (DR) against their superior even though they were on duty because they were worried that they might retaliate; they've seen cases where admin officers had not included punishments for DRs in the 201 file for consideration; and some authorized personnel did not follow established policies when enforcing disciplinary actions; so, punishment became arbitrary and selective at times (2.50) were of the highest scored factors they agreed in being a challenge to the implementation of the delinquency report system. Meanwhile, non-officers agreed that they also hesitated to issue a disciplinary report (DR) against their superior even though they were on duty because they're worried that they might retaliate (3.16), the authorized persons who issued delinquency reports were selective on whom they reported and gave a delinquency report (3.00), and there were words or terms that appear once in a while

that they did not recognize or they were unclearly defined making it hard for them to understand DRS (2.85). However, the lowest score for officers was 2.00, which indicated that the CGNOS Office seemed neither interested nor supportive of DRS.

For non-officers, "I've seen cases where admin officers haven't included punishments for DRs in the 201 file for consideration" and "the CGNOS Office seems neither interested nor supportive of DRS" both with 2.65, got the lowest score. As the study's findings above made clear, officers and non-officers faced several challenges with the report system's policy. For example, officers might encounter words or terms that they were unfamiliar with or that were not clearly defined, which made it difficult for them to understand the DRS. They might also be reluctant to file a disciplinary report (DR) against their superior while on duty out of fear of reprisals. Comparatively, according to research by Christenson (2014), 47% of victims who chose not to report, stated that they did so because they were afraid of backlash. Not surprisingly, 62% of victims who did report experiencing retaliation in the form of administrative, social, or professional measures. Additionally, it was noteworthy that the Philippine Coast Guard was deliberately ignoring some cases of misbehavior, as discovered by Pulkkinen and Writer (2024).

Moreover, for the treatment or disposition of DRs, findings revealed that the personnel's assessment on the challenges on implementing the delinquency report system ranged from agree to disagree. When looking at the assessment of officers, they agreed that authorized personnel to issue DR always resort to warnings, even for second or repeated offenses (3.00) in being a challenge to the implementation of the delinquency report system. Meanwhile, non-officers agreed that the PCG delinquency report system was being used for trainees in the regional training centers (3.14), hence, it was a challenge to the implementation of the report system. On the other hand, for officers, the punishments for DRs could be harsh, even for minor offenses (1.60) got the lowest score while for non-officers, admin officers included revoked DRs in the count, which went against the guidelines for DR treatment/disposition (2.63) got the lowest score. Worsley (2023) further supported this finding by asserting that a unit's strong esprit de corps might also incite troops to conceal misconduct. A 14-year-old girl and her family were slaughtered by soldiers in Iraq in 2006 after they were raped and killed. This was an example of this behavior. The soldiers' strong sense of friendship inside the unit caused them to fail to disclose the offenses. Concerned for their safety, the soldier who finally came forward to report the incident was ostracized.

Lastly, upon examining the report system for punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition, the results showed that the awareness of officers and non-officers range from agree to fairly agree. For officers, they agreed that there were no clear parameters for the inaction of disposition (2.80), there were no clear parameters for withholding of disposition (2.75) and there were no clear parameters for delaying of disposition (2.75). For non-officers, they agreed that there was no clear process for reporting personnel who did not act on the disposition of PCG delinquency report (2.90), there was no clear process for reporting personnel who would withhold the disposition of PCG delinquency report (2.88), and there was no clear process for reporting personnel who would delay the disposition of PCG delinquency report (2.84). Meanwhile, the lowest score for officers was 2.20, indicating that there was no clear process for reporting personnel who would withhold the disposition of PCG delinquency report.

On the other hand, for non-officers, there were no clear parameters for delaying of disposition (2.71) got the lowest score. Finally, the punishment for withholding, delaying, and inaction of disposition was difficult for both officers and non-officers because there were no clear guidelines for inaction of disposition and no clear procedure for reporting personnel who would withhold the PCG delinquency report. As Abanilla (2024) claimed, PCG employees had serious knowledge and competence gaps, especially when it came to applying certain criminal laws and processes that were pertinent to maritime law enforcement. Although staff members had a basic understanding of the law, it was found that they occasionally struggled to use this information effectively when conducting law enforcement activities. Furthermore, there was a significant relationship between personnel's skill levels, education, and training, indicating that focused training programs and ongoing professional development were essential for improving the PCG's operational efficacy.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **Conclusions**

- ☞ It could be gleaned that the Delinquency Report System (DRS) implemented at the Coast Guard Non-Officer School (CGNOS) was essentially moderately to highly effective by both officers and non-officers. On the other hand, there were numerous challenges within its practical application that needed to be

taken care of for optimized functionality. This indicated the perception of the policies, procedures, treatment dispositions, and punishment as related to the DRS that there was alignment but still brought out critical areas of improvement.

- ☞ The main area pointed out to was lack of clarity and consistency in the system. Officers and non-officers alike expressed difficulties in understanding certain terms and processes within the DRS. The confusion characterized the aspects of punishment disposition for withholding, delaying, or failing to act on delinquency reports.
- ☞ Lack of clear guidelines caused inconsistency in enforcement and could be a breeding ground for selective punishment or arbitrary decision-making. Another challenge was that both parties often face difficulties in issuing delinquency reports; especially when issuing it to superiors or PCG personnel outside the CGNOS office. This reluctance, based on fear of a retaliatory backlash, serves as a further reminder to set up a safer, transparent system for reporting.
- ☞ In addition, what really stood out were concerns the personnel had regarding training and available resources to maintain the DRS. Non-officers primarily complained about insufficient training and support, which hampered the proper utilization of the system.
- ☞ Officers were frustrated by the complexities in the system and long timelines that were involved before meting out punishment. Operational inefficiencies could prolong the process in general disciplinary actions. These inefficiencies adversely affected the morale and accountability in the institution.
- ☞ The study also argued that despite these challenges, there was no significant difference in the way officers and non-officers perceived or implemented the DRS. The uniformity indicated that problems were systemic and not influenced by rank or position.

### **Recommendations**

Based on the conclusions of this study, the following recommendations are proposed:

- ☞ The DRS terms and procedures should be clearly defined. This can be done by simplifying the terms of the system and by providing clear, easily accessible reference materials. Regular workshops and training sessions on the processes of the system can further ensure that all personnel understand their roles and responsibilities.
- ☞ In the handling of fear of retaliation, the CGNOS must develop anonymous reporting mechanisms that will ensure a no-retaliation policy. This will make a safer environment for everyone to report misconduct without fear of reprisal.
- ☞ Coast guard non-officers' school officers and non-officer training should be extended regularly as appropriate which will ensure that every single personnel member is trained effectively on the skills and the knowledge needed to deliver service with the DRS efficiently.
- ☞ The coast guard should establish clearer and more uniform guidelines for the imposition of punishments, especially for offenses related to withholding, delaying, or inaction in the disposition of delinquency reports. Further, the timeframes associated with handling these issues need to be standardized to eliminate delays and increase accountability.
- ☞ There must be ample resources provided, in terms of man and machine, which will be available for the DRS so that it can operate satisfactorily. For example, it must remove much of the administrative burden the system creates and facilitate easier use of modern tools in keeping and managing delinquency reports.
- ☞ There must be an amendment to certain provisions of the existing circular and practice governing the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Delinquency Report System that will cater the findings of the study.

### **Declarations**

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